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Introduction
Protective sentences can be imposed under a number of provisions. These include:
(1) Section 80(2)(b) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (formerly section 2(2)(b)
of the Criminal Justice Act 1991)2 by which courts may extend the “normal sentence” 3 that may be
appropriate for a *Crim. L.R. 694 serious “violent”4 or “sexual”5 offence if of the opinion that only such
a sentence would be adequate to protect the public from “serious harm”6 from the offender.
(2) Section 109 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (formerly section 2 of the
Crime (Sentences) Act 19977 which provides for automatic life sentences for offenders who commit a
second “serious offence”.8
(3) The use of “extended sentences” under section 85 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing)
Act 2000 (formerly section 58 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998).
(4) Discretionary life sentences.
In summary, the research set out to identify and examine in as much detail as possible cases dealt
with under these provisions over a six month period in six Crown Court Centres in order to discover
more about the nature of judicial reasoning, the extent of transparency in decision making, and
whether there were any discernible relationships in their use.
Previous Research
The only relevant previous empirical research was that carried out by Flood-Page and Mackie which
examined the operation of section 80(2)(b) as part of a larger study on Crown Court and Magistrates'
Courts sentencing practices.9 The study sampled 1,777 cases sentenced in 18 Crown Court centres
between September 1995 and February 1996. The main aim of the report with regard to protective
sentences was simply to discover how many there were. As may be seen from Table 1, three per cent
of custodial sentences where the offender was convicted of a violent offence and six per cent of
custodial sentences where the offender was convicted of *Crim. L.R. 695 sex offences (mainly
indecent assault) were passed as section 80(2)(b) sentences. The average sentence length in section
80(2)(b) cases for violent offences was 7.2 years compared to 2.3 years for commensurate
sentences, whilst for sexual offences the averages were 5.1 years and 3.0 years respectively.10 The
study also produced some basic information about the kinds of cases in which protective sentences
were passed and, more particularly, tried to look at the type of information that judges used to assess
the risk posed by the offender. However, despite the fact that the information was not detailed, the
following findings are significant, if not particularly surprising.11
(i) All sexual offenders and the majority of violent offenders receiving longer than commensurate
sentences under section 80(2)(b) had previous convictions which included convictions for similar
offences.
(ii) The fact that the defendant was mentally ill was a factor in the decision to pass a section 80(2)(b)
sentence in five of the 13 cases where a protective sentence was passed. In the one example
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provided where the offender had pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted rape of a 78 year old
woman, the judge was unable to make a hospital order since psychiatric reports suggested that the
mental illness would not respond to treatment.12 Similarly, three first offenders in the sample were
also described as “mentally ill”.
From the limited information provided it is impossible to establish what proportion of those described
as “mentally ill” in the sample could also be described as “dangerous severe personality disordered
(DSPD) offenders” (assuming such a diagnosis is possible), but there are undoubtedly many violent
and sexual offenders who suffer from various degrees of mental instability which may consist of an
“untreatable” personality disorder and who are deemed to be dangerous.13 Such offenders may in
future be detained indefinitely if found to be suffering from a severe personality disorder which as a
consequence renders them a serious risk to the public.14
*Crim. L.R. 696 It should also be pointed out that there are no research studies which examine the
operation of section 109 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. The Government
has suggested that the number of indeterminate life sentences is likely to rise following the
implementation of section 109 and contribute to a reduction in the number of DSPD offenders free to
commit serious violent and sexual crimes.15 The fact remains, however, that section 109 has many
serious deficiencies, particularly since several child-related offences such as indecent assault,
indecency with a child and child abduction are excluded from the qualifying list of “serious offences”,
and other important anomalies exist.16 Similarly, no empirical research exists which evaluates the use
of extended sentences under section 85 or discretionary life sentences.17
Methodology
The research sample was drawn from cases listed for hearing at six First Tier Crown Court Centres
selected from each of the six Circuits, i.e. Cardiff (Wales and Chester): Lewes (South Eastern):
Nottingham (Midland and Oxford): Preston (Northern): Sheffield (North Eastern) and Winchester
(Western). This number represented 6.7 per cent of the 90 Crown Court Centres (including Greater
London Centres) and ensured adequate representation from each Circuit.18
More specifically, it was decided to concentrate on the following specific offence groups which fall
within the ambit of section 80(2)(b):
Manslaughter, wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent, rape, attempted rape and
indecent assault.
561 cases falling within these offence categories were identified from the weekly Running Lists
supplied by each participating Crown Court Centre for the six month period--December 1998 to May
199919 (see Table 2). Although section 80(2)(b) is applicable in cases where the defendant is
convicted 20 of an offence which falls within the specified sexual or violent offence categories,21 it
proved impractical to identify cases at the point of conviction. The offence categories were chosen on
the basis that they included the most common and seriously perceived violent and sexual offences.
There is some overlap between those “violent” and “sexual” offences covered by section 80(2)(b) and
“serious offences” relevant to section 109. For example, manslaughter, wounding or causing grievous
bodily harm with intent, rape and attempted rape are “qualifying” offences under section 109, whilst
indecent assault is not included. As part of the research it was, therefore, decided to identify cases
where the offence “triggering” the automatic life sentence was either manslaughter, *Crim. L.R. 697
wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent, rape or attempted rape. Cases involving
discretionary life sentences and extended sentences under section 85 were likewise identified from
the trial record sheet (Form 5089).22
Additional information for all sample cases was obtained from the trial record sheet which was also
used to identify relevant court reporting firms from which verbatim transcripts of relevant trial
proceedings were obtained.23 In longer than commensurate and automatic life sentence cases the
transcripts analysed consisted of the judge's summing-up, defence counsel's mitigation on sentence
and the judge's sentencing remarks, whereas only the latter were analysed in cases involving
discretionary life sentences and extended sentences.
Longer than commensurate and automatic life sentence cases were studied in detail using the case
study method24 in an effort to develop as full an understanding of each case as possible. This
“holistic” focus was, therefore, refined in terms of specific research questions and the desire to
develop propositions which were generalizable to other “similar” cases. A more limited application of
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this research technique was possible for discretionary life sentence and “extended sentence” cases.
The research was, therefore, concerned to examine the context of specific sentencing decisions in
the trial process by describing and analysing the appropriation and assimilation of relevant
information as an externally observable process, whilst also considering the extent to which trial
participants might appear to share similar perceptions of relevant case material and legal rules.
Results
Extended supervision
Undoubtedly, the most significant findings relate to the use of extended supervision under section 85
and section 86.
As may be seen from Table 5, some form of extended supervision was imposed in 30 (5.4 per cent)
of sample cases. It is important from the outset to point out that the expression “extended
supervision” is used deliberately to encompass the use of either section 86 of the Powers of Criminal
Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (formerly *Crim. L.R. 698 section 44 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991)
or section 85.25 The significance of this for the research is considerable since, in addition to extending
supervision to sexual and violent offenders, section 85 only came into force on September 30, 1998
and applies only to offences committed after that date.
It is frequently overlooked in section 86 cases that section 86(1)(b) mandates the court to have regard
to the matters referred to in section 32(6)(a) and (b) of the 1991 Act when ordering that section 86
should apply. The matters referred to in section 32 are: a) the need to protect the public from serious
harm from offenders; and b) the desirability of preventing the commission by them of further offences
and securing their rehabilitation. I would submit that in order to satisfy the section 86(1)(b)
requirement the court must articulate its reasons as consistent with section 32(a) and (b) since there
is otherwise no external recognition that this mandatory provision has been complied with. This
occurred in only two of the 20 sample cases where section 86 applied. Furthermore, the effect of the
licence arrangements imposed was not fully explained and the 1998 Practice Direction on custodial
sentences inadequately complied with in six sample cases. More significant was the level of
incomplete or inadequate explanation provided in the 10 section 85 cases. In seven cases there was
no explanation of the rationale for applying section 85 and its effect was fully explained in only six
cases. In two cases the issue was specifically left to defence counsel and in another the judge simply
stated “I make a two year extended supervision order under section 58 of the Crime and Disorder Act.
You may go down.” In addition to appearing contrary to the expressed intention of the 1998 Practice
Direction on custodial sentences, these deficiencies are important since section 85 itself is quite
explicit in its explanatory requirements. In particular, section 85(1)(b) refers to the fact that section 85
applies only where the offender would, apart from this section, be subject to licence requirements
which in the court's opinion would be inadequate “for the purpose of preventing the commission by
him of further offences and securing his rehabilitation”. Clearly, there is an obligation for the sentencer
to place reasons on the record. Such transparency is essential where the potential exists for an
extremely lengthy period of incarceration.
Turning now more directly to the data in Table 5, the following remarks should be prefaced by the
comment that the figures necessarily reflect the seriousness of cases present in the sample.
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the data should be regarded as “representative” since the sample
includes all relevant case categories *Crim. L.R. 699 listed for hearing during a randomly selected
six month period in centres representing each of the six Crown Court circuits.
Subject to this proviso, the data are interesting in that they indicate that, in the offence categories
examined, 30 (5.4 per cent) of cases were serious enough to warrant longer than normal supervision
on licence. Even on these figures, the “extended sentence” appears to be a more attractive
sentencing option than the longer than commensurate sentence under section 80(2)(b) (1.79 per cent
compared with 0.9 per cent sample use). Winchester was the only Circuit Centre where section 85
was not applied in the sample cases.
In its recently issued Consultation Paper on the use of extended sentences the Sentencing Advisory
Panel cites Home Office statistics which show 15 extended sentences were passed in 1999 and at
least 50 in 2000, pointing out that the actual use of extended sentences was probably greater
because the Crown Court computer system has not yet been adapted to recognise extended
sentences separately.26 The figures from this research tend to suggest that the Home Office figures
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may be a significant underestimate. Given that the research data (10 extended sentences) related to
a six month period (December 1998 to May 1999) shortly after extended sentences were introduced
and covered only 6.7 per cent of Crown Court centres, a reasonable estimate based on these figures
would suggest something in the region of 100 extended sentences being passed during 1999. It
should also be borne in mind that the research information was obtained directly from trial record
sheets and confirmed by analysis of the judge's sentencing comments in each case. It would seem,
therefore, that the 30 per cent increase recorded by the Home Office for 2000 is just beginning to
reflect reality; that extended sentences have been used extensively by the judiciary since their
introduction in September 1998.
In one case only was a section 80(2)(b) sentence combined with an “extended sentence” under
section 85. This case bears further analysis, particularly in the context of Thomas's suggestion27 that
such a combination may result in “a crushingly long period of custody which is totally out of proportion
to the gravity of the offence and the risk presented by the offender.” In the instant case the defendant
(convicted of offences involving serious violence including section 18) received sentences totalling 79
months. On the basis that the offender would ordinarily have been automatically released at the
two-thirds point of his sentence (52.6 months) and only remained on licence until the three-quarters
point (59.3 months), an “extended sentence” of 36 months under section 58 was imposed by the
judge on public protection grounds. In so doing the judge drew particular attention to the defendant's
paranoid personality, his lack of remorse and his aggressively violent and uncontrollable temper.
However, the psychiatrist's report specifically recommended anger management, assertiveness
training and problem-solving skills training, all of which were currently available in prison, and further
stated that there would be no advantage in extending the defendant's sentence in terms of risk
management. Although the retributivist element in this sentence was justified on the basis that an
“extended sentence” would not result in a sentence totally out of proportion with the gravity of the
offence, the consequentialist (reductivist) risk element was not fully supported by the available
evidence. In such circumstances it *Crim. L.R. 700 becomes difficult to support a potential increase
in a custodial term of over one-third.
Protective sentences under section 80(2)(b)
As is evident from Table 3, only five (0.9 per cent)--a surprisingly small number of sample
cases--were passed as section 80(2)(b) sentences. The only comparable Home Office figures28 are
those drawn from Flood-Page and Mackie's study (discussed earlier) where, from a sample of 372
violent and sex offences, 3.5 per cent of offenders convicted received a section 80(2)(b) sentence
(Table 1). The relative absence of section 80(2)(b) sentences in the sample was both unexpected and
significant in that the sample itself represented a large percentage (82.5 per cent) of all selected
violent and sexual offences listed for hearing during the six month data collection period.29
Furthermore, the offence categories selected were (with the exception of manslaughter) likely to be
well represented as listed cases across the six Circuits.30
The paucity of section 80(2)(b) cases may have been due to the fact that defendants' previous
convictions included “serious offences” which triggered the imposition of an automatic life sentence
under section 109. For example, if a person convicted of rape or some other serious sexual offence
had a previous conviction under section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 for causing
grievous bodily harm with intent, section 80(2)(b) would no longer apply and the offender would
receive a life sentence under section 109, unless exceptional circumstances applied. However,
section 80(2)(b) remains significant largely because the definitions of “violent” and “sexual” offence
under section 80(2)(b) are not synonymous with that of a “serious offence” under section 109.
Further, although section 109 only came into force on October 1, 1997 (as section 2 of the Crime
(Sentences) Act 1997) and is, of course, mandatory, this would not have effected the throughput of
potentially relevant cases since the first serious offence could have been committed before the
section came into force.
The research also examined the extent of judicial compliance with the procedural requirements
contained in section 79(4) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (formerly section
2(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991). Section 79(4)(a) requires the sentencer to state in open court
that he is of the opinion that section 80(2)(b) applies and give reasons which support that opinion,
whilst section 79(4)(b) imposes an obligation on the sentencer to explain to the defendant in open
court and in ordinary language why it is passing a custodial sentence on him. Significantly, the former
section 2(3)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 stated that the court's duty was to “explain to the
offender in open court and in ordinary language why the sentence is for such a term ”. This wording
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was *Crim. L.R. 701 ambiguous in that it could have been construed as referring to the passing of an
ordinary commensurate sentence, or, as imposing an additional requirement (in section 2(2)(b) of the
1991 Act cases) to explain further the court's reasons for imposing a longer than commensurate term
on the defendant. The requirements of section 79(4)(a) were fully adhered to in all five sample section
80(2)(b) cases, although the explanatory requirements then imposed by section 2(3)(b) of the 1991
Act remained unfulfilled in the majority of cases where either no or an inadequate explanation was
given to the defendant. Similarly, although discounts for guilty pleas31 were given in three cases no
explanation was forthcoming, nor was the extent of the discount made clear.32 Furthermore, despite
the significance attached to the distinction between the commensurate and protective elements in the
section 80(2)(b) disposal drawn by the Court of Appeal and section 28 or the Crime (Sentences) Act
1997, in no sample case was this relationship identified and explained by the judge.
All five sample cases equated the determination of “dangerousness” with the defendant's inability to
control his violent and/or sexual impulses. However, the relationship between aggravating and
mitigating factors and the perceived need to protect the public from future serious harm is complex
and fundamental to determining appropriate levels of risk and anticipated harm. The transcript
analysis looked for evidence of the following potentially relevant personal circumstances: remorse,
victim vulnerability, gaps in offending, lack of pattern, reduction in serious offences, successfully
completed previous sentences, behaviour following charge, age, health, reparation and assistance to
the police. Although age and assistance to the police were mentioned in two cases no other factors
were evident except remorse and victim vulnerability. In the section 18 case it was the defendant's
repeated failure to express any kind of remorse for his victims which was particularly significant. The
psychiatric report suggested that the defendant's personality disorder allowed him to acknowledge his
wrongdoing, the pleasure he derived from acts of violence and his need for treatment, whilst
simultaneously being devoid of feelings of guilt, remorse or individual responsibility. In the two
indecent assault cases remorse associated with a willingness to acknowledge a predisposition to
future offending behaviour were regarded as significant determinants of risk management (rather than
assessment) and as post hoc justifications for the decision to impose a longer than commensurate
sentence. In such cases victim vulnerability33 was the key determinant of predicted harm whilst
unreformed paedophilic orientation coupled with several similar previous convictions were key
determinants of risk, although the judicial language ranged from the defendant “remaining a threat to
others” to posing “a very grave risk” or “a grave and escalating risk”.
It is clear that the judicial decision on probability that there must be a “substantial risk” of further
offending should be based on psychiatric opinion where the *Crim. L.R. 702 defendant has a mental
or personality problem.34 Although the present sample is small there is some indication that judges in
any event draw the main inferences on risk from previous convictions and offence circumstances, and
see this as the determinant factors to be extracted from any psychiatric report. Two cases involving
paedophiles with abnormal personality traits provide an illustration. In the first, where no psychiatric
report was obtained, the judge declared that the section 80(2)(b) sentence was passed on the basis
that the defendant was an unreformed paedophile coupled with the large number of previous
convictions This clearly took precedence over the possibility suggested in the pre-sentence report that
therapy and assistance during a normal commensurate sentence might help the defendant to
overcome his predisposition. In the second case, which did involve a psychiatric report, an identical
result was achieved since the judge concentrated on the defendant's past record and predisposition in
assessing risk whilst ignoring the fact that the psychiatrist had specifically counselled against an
extended sentence, arguing that community supervision following release from a normal
commensurate term would be as effective in reducing the risk of re-offending. Such cases suggest
that judicial interpretation of information concerning the sentencing process is contingent on attitudinal
variables35 that include (inter alia ) penal philosophy. If these findings were to be replicated they might
lead us to further question the wisdom of allowing the determination of “dangerousness” to remain a
judicial decision.
With one exception judges, as required,36 clearly alerted defence counsel to the possibility that a
longer than commensurate sentence was contemplated. It is interesting to note that a major
component in the construction of defence mitigation related to the treatment issue. In circumstances
where expert opinion recommended treatment the likely unavailability of suitable treatment
programmes, facilities and the predicted uncertainty of outcome enabled defence counsel to argue
forcefully against the desirability of any extended period of custody under section 80(2)(b). However,
where expert opinion suggested a good prognosis following a specialist treatment programme the
mitigation was clearly divided between the need to address traditional commensurate concerns (such
as credit for a guilty plea, age, good character, etc.) and the incongruity of an additional protective
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term based on contingent future behaviour. At this point the mitigation generally advanced the
defendant's willingness to undertake any available treatment. Hence, it appears that mitigating factors
are predominantly examined in a way consistent with the proportionality rationale of just deserts and,
therefore, relate specifically to harm and culpability of the conduct in terms of crime seriousness. In
mitigation terms, it is arguable that defence counsel fail to draw out the distinction between the
relevance of previous convictions to the assessment of desert and their major impact on risk
prediction. This dichotomy also reflects the judicial tendency to focus on previous convictions and
offence circumstances as risk determinants at the expense of wider social factors.
*Crim. L.R. 703 The “loosening” of the relationship between commensurability and public protection
in Chapman 37 may well accentuate the consequences flowing from the incompatible rationales
implicit in section 80(2)(b). If, as Thomas suggests,38 the protective element in the sentence expands
to compensate for discounts in the proportionate term following a guilty plea, defence counsel's
attention will inevitably need to focus on strategies to attack section 80(2)(b)'s social defence
rationale. Hence, the commensurate concerns of traditional mitigation will be replaced by a need to
address more directly the risk and harm prediction issue. Correspondingly, the narrow judicial
approach to the assessment of “dangerousness”, whilst perhaps understandable, will be further
exposed as inadequate.39
Automatic life sentences under section 109
Although there is no statutory requirement for sentencers to provide an explanation of their reasons
for the imposition of an automatic life sentence to the defendant under section 109 (since it is
mandatory), such an explanation would, nevertheless, be compatible with the expressed wishes of
the Court of Appeal regarding transparency contained in the 1998 Practice Direction on Custodial
Sentences40 which applies (inter alia ) to discretionary life sentences. In none of the four section 109
cases examined in the research was any such explanation forthcoming, there being instead a simple
statement that each was a case where an automatic life sentence applied. This is in marked contrast
to the obligation imposed by section 109(3), which applies where the court does not impose a life
sentence under section 109, requiring it to state in open court that it is of the opinion that there are
“exceptional circumstances relating to either of the offences or to the offender”41 which justify it in not
imposing a life sentence under section 109 and what the “exceptional circumstances” are. Again,
there is no statutory obligation under section 109(2) for sentencers to state in open court that there
are no “exceptional circumstances” applicable, but this seems the logical corollary of section 109(3)
and is what occurred in the four sample cases. Hence, typically the sentencer stated that the only
course open was the imposition of an automatic life sentence and that there were no “exceptional
circumstances” applicable without further elaboration. There was no explanation of how and what
factors might amount to “exceptional circumstances” and the rationale for their non-applicability in the
instant case.
Notwithstanding, of much greater significance was the apparent injustice in sample cases produced
by the mandatory nature of section 109 and forthrightly *Crim. L.R. 704 expressed by one particular
judge. In addition to the technical anomalies produced by section 109,42 the opinions expressed by
this judge were no doubt symptomatic of a much wider disenchantment43 with section 109 and remain
a cause of serious concern given the Government's acceptance of the strategic significance of section
109 in dealing with “dangerous” offenders (see post ). Whilst the need for strained interpretation of the
“exceptional circumstances” exception was firmly dispelled by Lord Woolf C.J. in the important case of
Offen, 44 it is worth noting the extent of judicial opprobrium expressed in Turner 45 where Rougier J.
delivered the Court of Appeal's judgment in connection with the fourth sample case which was heard
by Swanson H.H.J. at Sheffield Crown Court in September 1999. At first instance the judge dealt at
length with the implications of section 109 and the nature of the “exceptional circumstances”
exception. The facts of the case were straightforward insofar as the defendant was found guilty of one
count of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm which “triggered” the automatic life
sentence provision in section 109. However, the previous “serious offence” was a conviction for
manslaughter committed in 1967 when the appellant was 22 and for which he was sentenced to three
years imprisonment. In mitigation it was suggested that there were facts relating to both offences
which were probably “exceptional” by themselves, although not likely to be accepted as such
following Kelly. 46 For example, the three year sentence for manslaughter was a “very modest
sentence” which the judge agreed reflected that the victim's death had been largely a matter of luck
resulting from an assault. Similarly, the second offence resulted from a verbal argument, and the
material point appears to have been the use of excessive force by the defendant. In addition, it was
accepted that the defendant was not “dangerous” and there was no evidence that he was likely to
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re-offend; that he was “effectively of good character”, a “popular” and “decent” man and that the victim
in the case had previously and far more recently been convicted of a serious offence.
Nevertheless, Swanson H.H.J. recognised that (following Kelly ) the length of time between offences
could not be exceptional any more than the fact that the defendant was not a danger to the public.
The learned judge expressed his frustration thus:
“I have struggled, but can in conscience and in my attempt to interpret the law, see no way that I can
find that there are in the circumstances of this case, or in your circumstances, exceptional
circumstances to justify me not imposing a life sentence. You are a popular man. That may give
cause to the public, certainly where you live, to wonder if this kind of statute is the kind of statute that
they really want in a civilised society … ”.
*Crim. L.R. 705 It is somewhat ironic that the pre-sentence report had been unequivocal in
suggesting that a form of community sentence was an eminently suitable disposal for the offender. In
expressing the Court of Appeal's opinion Rougier J. indicated that in passing section 2 of the Crime
(Sentences) Act 1997 Parliament must have realised that a judge's sense of justice might be offended
and noted (significantly) that there had been no submissions on matters of human rights law. The
application had to be refused “even where to the distaste of the court, the result exemplified the type
of injustice which the 1997 Act could bring about”.
It is perhaps instructive to compare these observations with those of Rose L.J. in Stephens. 47 It is
submitted that the Court of Appeal reached an absurd result in deciding that where defence counsel
failed to inform the defendant as to the likelihood of his receiving a mandatory life sentence if he were
to be convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent (having previously been convicted of a
“qualifying offence”) this was capable of amounting to an “exceptional circumstance” within section
109(3). In this case the court found that, if the defendant had been made aware of the fact he might
have decided to plead guilty to the alternative charge of inflicting grievous bodily harm, a plea
acceptable to the Crown, and would thereby have avoided the mandatory provisions of section 109.
Although this was not a circumstance “regularly, routinely or normally encountered” (as Kelly
suggested), or one suggesting that the offender did not constitute a significant risk to the public (as
Offen now suggests) this case seems to place a further premium on plea as a bureaucratic expedient
which equates with justice only in the sense of the defendant having been deprived of an opportunity
to manipulate the system to his own advantage without referring to the merits of the case.
Discretionary life sentences
It should be noted that there has been persistent legislative failure to consider the relationship
between the determinate protective sentence under section 80(2)(b) and the indeterminate sentence
of life imprisonment. Where a discretionary life sentence for a “violent” or “sexual” offence is
contemplated on public protection grounds the criteria in section 80(2)(b) must be complied with:
(section 80(4), formerly section 2(4) Criminal Justice Act 1991). In such a case, as confirmed in
Chapman 48 the gravity of the offence must be such as to merit a very long sentence, and the public
protection condition must be satisfied by evidence that the offender is likely to remain a serious
danger to the public for an indeterminate period. Furthermore, the fact remains that, according to the
second criterion in Hodgson, life imprisonment is only appropriate for offenders whose mental
condition renders them dangerous to the public but does not amount to a “psychopathic disorder”
(“treatable” under the Mental Health Act 1983) when a hospital order with restriction may apply.
However, a discretionary life sentence imposed for the purposes of retribution or deterrence rather
than public protection need not comply with section 80(2)(b); Baker. 49
The four discretionary life cases were initially examined against the criteria for the imposition of such
sentences set out in Hodgson. 50 Three of the cases involved serious and persistent indecent assault,
rape and indecency offences (two within a *Crim. L.R. 706 family context) whilst the fourth involved
murder,51 attempted murder, robbery and section 18 offences. In terms of the Hodgson criteria, all
four cases justified life sentences on the basis of offence gravity; three on the basis that the
defendant was likely to remain a serious danger to the public for an indefinite period and one (the
murder case) where the defendant was suffering from a mental incapacity falling short of a treatable
psychopathic disorder within the terms of the Mental Health Act 1983. On the question of whether it is
possible to differentiate discretionary life and section 80(2)(b) cases, the judge in the one sample
case involving a regressive paedophile deliberated between these two sentencing options and took
significant account of the public's “right to demand that the court did everything in its power to ensure
that the defendant would never again be free to present such a risk to young children”.
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Although clearly justified on the basis of the Hodgson criteria in the instant case, public perception is
likely to assume an increased significance in judicial decisionmaking to the extent that the emphasis
in the Hodgson criteria on seriousness is diminished in favour of risk and harm assessment.52 In such
circumstances public perceptions of dangerousness and victim vulnerability may (together with
previous convictions) assume disproportionate significance in judicial assessments of risk and
anticipated future harm at the expense of psychiatric and medical report recommendations. As
Thomas suggests, the balance may be maintained by ensuring that the cut-off period specified under
section 28 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 does not fall below a certain figure designed to support
the seriousness of the offence criteria in Hodgson. 53 However, even within these constraints the
indirect influence of perceived public opinion, together with increased significance accorded to victim
impact statements, may be significant in judicial determinations on the degree of dangerousness, thus
upsetting the fine balance between seriousness and dangerousness sought in Chapman. In
circumstances where offence seriousness is insufficient to satisfy the Hodgson criteria a longer than
commensurate term under section 80(2)(b) is more consistent with logic and principle. This is clearly
an area requiring some guidance from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). As regards the
operation of section 28 itself, it is disturbing that only one judge complied fully with the obligation to
state and explain the significance of the “specified period”, thereby also complying with the 1998
Practice Direction on custodial sentencing. Of the remainder, one judge was reminded of its existence
by counsel and no mention or indirect reference to its provisions made in the other two sample cases.
*Crim. L.R. 707 It is also interesting that the proportion of discretionary life sentences remained
small (0.7 per cent), although not surprising given the continued existence of the restrictive Hodgson
criteria.54 Nevertheless, the apparent willingness of the judiciary to embrace the concept of the
recently introduced “extended sentence”55 as a separate protective measure is particularly significant
and receives further comment later. This point is reinforced by the data in Table 4 which indicate the
distribution of offences receiving some form of protective sentence in the sample. From this it is
evident that 80 per cent of the “extended sentences” were passed for cases of indecent assault,
although it must be remembered that approximately twice as many offenders are sentenced annually
in the Crown Court for indecent assault than for rape in the Crown Court.56 More significant, however,
is the apparent preference in the sample for “extended sentences” in relevant sex offence cases
rather than for offenders sentenced for assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.57
Conclusions and implications
The most significant findings of this research undoubtedly relate to the apparent judicial preference
for using the new form of extended sentence provided by section 85. I would suggest that there
appear to be several inter-related aspects to this development:
(1) As the results confirm, there is paucity in the application of section 80(2)(b). Despite attempts to
reconcile the reductivist credentials of section 80(2)(b) as an exception to the just deserts rationale for
sentencing explicit in the 1991 Act,58 its judicial neglect is due in no uncertain measure to judicial
unease with the considerable burden of having to decide essentially non-legal issues relating to
predicted risk and harm with such profound consequences for the deprivation of individual liberty. In
addition, numerous difficulties continue to hinder the successful operation of section 80(2)(b), namely;
the ongoing uncertainty as to what is (or is not) a “sexual” or “violent” offence as defined; the balance
to be maintained between risk and harm in the assessment of dangerousness and its relationship to
commensurability; the human rights implications of the *Crim. L.R. 708 release provisions applicable
to section 80(2)(b); the appropriate relationship between the commensurate and the protective
elements of the sentence; and the appropriateness and consequences of a guilty plea discount.
These issues together with uncertainty as to choice between respective prospective measures are
likely to militate against the combination of a longer than commensurate sentence with an extended
supervision period under section 85.
(2) More probable, as this research tends to support, is an increased use of section 85 in combination
with a commensurate sentence under section 80(2)(a). For example, its use in serious indecent
assault cases59 coupled with proposed changes in offence definitions and penalties60 must surely
provide a considerably more effective penal response than currently exists.
(3) This research reflects continued judicial uncertainty as to the appropriate choice between the
protective measures currently available. This has been exacerbated by the retention of automatic life
sentences under section 109, which continue to attract judicial opprobrium and general condemnation
from commentators, yet appear certain to remain central to the Government's essentially “bifurcatory”
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penal policy. As confirmed by the recent Home Affairs Select Committee Report,61 the general
expansion of this measure for DSPD offenders is viewed with equanimity and tacit approval. As
Thomas suggests62 there remains (following Offen ) a need for later decisions to clarify exactly what
amounts to a significant risk to the public--by no means a straight-forward task--and, in any event, the
numerous fundamental objections to such forms of collective incapacitation remain.63 The continued
existence of such legislative provisions also exacerbates the palpable tension between Government
penal policy and the higher judiciary's perceived need to defend judicial independence in sentencing
matters which has persisted since the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Notwithstanding, arguments to
encourage the judicial use of discretionary life sentences64 ignore the fundamental need for further
Court of Appeal guidance on the appropriate relationship and choice between the various sentencing
alternatives. If section 80(2)(b) were to be abolished and section 109 remain, what would be the basis
for the indeterminate detention of a non-DPSD offender, since section 109 relies *Crim. L.R. 709 on
repeat offending and section 85 merely relies on extended supervision ?65 If indeterminate detention
is given to all dangerous offenders (subject to review) and made the only available sentence, what will
happen to the Hodgson criteria? Non-repeat offenders with “personality disorders” falling short of
DSPD which are currently prima facie section 80(2)(b) cases would undoubtedly benefit from
independent assessment66 and the appropriate use of extended supervision available under section
85.
(4) The research highlighted numerous examples of judicial failure fully to explain sentencing
decisions consistently with principles of openness and transparency exemplified by the 1998 Practice
Direction on Custodial Sentences.67 This is surely a matter of some concern, particularly in the
context of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights with its emphasis on public scrutiny
of the trial process in contested cases.
In summary, the research findings indicate that, so long as discretionary decisions on dangerousness
remain within the judiciary they are likely to focus disproportionately on legal factors (such as previous
convictions and offence seriousness) in making their judgments on risk and harm assessment. I
would submit that judicial reticence to use existing alternatives (such as section 80(2)(b) and
discretionary life sentences) stems from this long-standing fundamental flaw in dangerousness
provisions which require judges to weigh (often) complex medical evidence regarding predicted
behaviour with conventional legal factors relating to aggravation and mitigation. This is exacerbated
by a lack of Court of Appeal guidance, and manifests itself in a judicial failure to fully articulate the
reasons underlying the sentencing choices made. It is, therefore, not altogether surprising that the
judiciary may have indicated a preference for the concept of extended supervision where
dangerousness is predicted, since section 85 (in particular) makes a clear conceptual distinction
between fixing the custodial term and the extension period during which the offender will be subject to
licence and the rationale for each.
Further, the decision to add an extension period in section 85 is specifically tied to whether the court
considers the normal licence period applicable to the custodial term as adequate to achieve the
objectives stated in section 85(1)(b), namely, the prevention of crime and rehabilitation of the
offender. In 1985 Nigel Walker68 commented on the apparent reluctance by judges to use the form of
extended sentence originally introduced under the Criminal Justice Act 1967, suggesting that part of
the reason was due to the fact that judges generally were not in favour of determinate sentences
which exceeded what the offence itself seemed to merit. Although the rationales and forms of
contemporary protective sentence are manifestly different, I would suggest that vestiges of what
Walker calls “a retributive limitation” continue to govern the judicial approach to sentencing dangerous
offenders. The future attractiveness of section 85 may, therefore, lie in the separate bases for the
decisions relating to dangerousness and commensurability, despite the fact that the overall problem
of proportionality between offence gravity and *Crim. L.R. 710 sentence remains.69 The judicial
reliance on legal factors in predictive decision-making revealed in this research suggests that the
distinction between commensurability and prevention drawn by section 85 may be desirable.
Nevertheless, the discretionary decision on predicted dangerousness remains a judicial one. I would
suggest that, given the weak moral (and practical) justifications for these decisions, they should no
longer remain a solely judicial responsibility.
Table 1: Violent and Sex Offenders by type of custodial sentence1 (Home Office 1998)
No.
sentenced
No. receiving custodial
sentence
No. receiving protective
sentence
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n (%) n (%)
Violent
offences
292 171 (59) 82 (3)
Sex offences 80 69 (86) 53 (6)
Total 372 240 (65) 13 (3.5)4
Notes:
Table 2: Composition of research population by Crown Court Centre
Centre Missing
Cases1
Non-protective
sentences
Protective
sentences
Sample
population
Target
population
Sample as
percentage
of target
population
Cardiff 2 160 10 170 172 98.8
Lewes 2 33 5 38 40 96.0
Nottingham 3 116 7 123 126 97.6
Preston 14 93 10 103 117 88.0
Sheffield 62 72 2 74 136 54.4
Winchester 35 44 9 53 88 60.2
Total 118 518 43 561 679 82.5
Note:
Table 3: Protective Sentences by Crown Court Centre
Centre S.80(2)(b) S.109 Life S.85/S.86 Total
Cardiff 1 1 8 10
Lewes 1 1 1 2 5
Nottingham 2 5 7
Preston 1 1 8 10
Sheffield 1 1 2
Winchester 2 1 6 9
Total 5 4 4 30 43
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Table 4: Protective Sentences by Offence type
Offence1 S.80(2)(b) S.109 Life S.852 Total
Manslaughter 7 7
S.18 1 2 1 4
Rape 1 2 3 6
Attempted 1 1 2
rape
Indecent 3 8 11
assault
Total 5 4 11 10 30
Notes:
Table 5: Extended supervision by Crown Court Centre
S.86 S.85 Total
n (%) n (%) n (%)
Cardiff 6 (3.5) 2 (1.2) 8 (4.7)
Lewes 2 (5.3) 2 (5.3)
Nottingham 3 (2.4) 2 (1.6) 5 (4.1)
Preston 5 (4.9) 3 (2.9) 8 (7.8)
Sheffield 1 (1.4) 1 (1.4)
Winchester 6 (11.3) 6 (11.3)
Note:
Percentages
are
calculated
on the basis
of the total
of sample
cases for
each Centre,
i.e. Cardiff
(170),
Lewes (38),
Nottingham
(123)
Preston
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(103),
Sheffield
(74),
Winchester
(53).
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